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PARADOX OF HIERARCHY AND CONFLICTS OF
VALUES: INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
Jootaek Lee*1
ABSTRACT—In an international society, hierarchies are set up differently
among different countries and societies based on different values, which are
naturally conflicting and colliding with each other and result in unstable
conditions. Is hierarchy really necessary in an international society? Does
more hierarchical order in international society mean more peace? Do we
need a supranational organization like the European Union whose laws can
pierce state sovereignty and bind citizens of each member state? Does the
United Nations need to be reformed to create an effective hierarchy, which
will give international society more peace, security, and protection of human
rights? This article may not answer all of these questions, but will attempt to
clarify hierarchical issues in international law, particularly in the human
rights field.

1 *Jootaek Lee, Assistant Professor and Law Librarian, Rutgers Law School. I would like to thank
James Britt, J.D. for his assistance.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

A hierarchy reflects cultural values within a society, evidenced by the
way governments structure a society to control power and allocate resources.
In a social hierarchy, people either follow orders from higher ranks or
indirectly through law and policy. People may follow orders from higherranked individuals because hierarchical values are considered more
important in the society compared to individual values. For example, in a
family oriented culture, as typically seen in Asian countries such as Korea,
China and Japan, ordered societal structure is more directly evident than in
work oriented cultures.2 This is because in family oriented cultures, the group
values are appreciated over those of the individual.3
Even though hierarchical communities are considered more traditional
and characteristics of the failed Communist experiment,4 hierarchies are also
found in the West. While modern democratic communities advocate equal
protection and fundamental freedoms, hierarchical ideology still makes up
the backbone of these societies because capitalism creates hierarchical
societal and corporate structures. Regardless of dictatorship or democratic

2 France is one exceptional case which shows a group-oriented hierarchy within Western culture. See
FONS TROMPENAARS & CHARLES HAMPEN-TURNER, RIDING THE WAVES OF CULTURE:
UNDERSTANDING DIVERSITY IN GLOBAL BUSINESS, 51–69 (1998); The Seven Dimensions of Culture:
Understanding
and
Managing
Cultural
Differences,
MIND
TOOLS,
https://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/seven-dimensions.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2019).
3 See TROMPENAARS, supra note 2.
4 See id. at 52–53.
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operation, hierarchies still exist and restrain people’s freedom of thought and
movement.
Law is naturally hierarchical, regulating a society and providing order.
Both naturalism and positivism are built on the assumption that there is a
higher value that controls and gives direction to society. Governments are
organized to keep order, enforce the law, and subdue any protests. In
capitalist societies, the government keeps order by controlling the wealthgenerating tool: money.5 Misapplying Marxism, communist and socialist
countries are also built on hierarchy—dictators and governments pass laws
to maintain a hierarchical order designed to protect community values.
Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal, the founders of policy-oriented
jurisprudence, suggest those values a society seeks include power,
enlightenment, wealth, well-being, skill, affection, respect and rectitude.6
These values are “empirically open,” and law regulates how individuals try
to shape and share each of the eight values.7 In policy-oriented jurisprudence,
law is “an ongoing process of authoritative and controlling decision”8 and
the “conveyor belt of human action.”9 Values are constantly reflected into
the decision making process, and through this authoritative process, the daily
life of individuals and their unilateral actions are controlled and acted upon
accordingly in a legal hierarchy consisting of the Constitution, statutes, rules
and regulations, and local ordinances and their interpretation by courts.
In constitutive process theory, William Michael Reisman suggests legal
systems establish a hierarchy to control unilateral actions.10 Out of the four
types of constitutive arrangements—first, unorganized and non-hierarchical
constitutive structures; second, ineffective constitutive structures; third,
effective but limited constitutive structures; and fourth, effective constitutive
structures11—the second, third and fourth types establish hierarchical
decision-making institutions. Furthermore, unilateral action is not justified

5 It is interesting to see the new development of block-chain technology, which denies this hierarchy
of capitalism and seeks a new order.
6 Siegfried Wiessner and Andrew R. Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human Rights
Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity, in GENERAL THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 207, 210 (Siegfried Wiessner ed., 2017) (citing HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES
S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY (1992)).
7
Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 211 (quoting Siegfried Wiessner, International Law in the 21st Century: Decisionmaking in
Institutionalized and Non-Institutionalized Settings, 23 THESAURUS ACROASIUM 137, 145 (1997)).
10 W. Michael Reisman, The Quest for World Order and Human Dignity in the Twenty-First Century:
Constitutive Process and Individual Commitment, in GENERAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 6, at 129, 136.
11 See id. at 133–37.
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in the fourth type of effective hierarchical institution.12 Here, it is worthwhile
to note that out of the four types of constitutive structures, only one type of
constitutive process will establish an effective hierarchical structure that will
successfully enforce the law, removing unilateral delictual action.13 It is
highly possible that hierarchical structure is ineffective or limited in an
authoritarian legal system or in an incomplete legal system that allows
exception—unilateral individual violations of law excused under certain
conditions.14
In order to assess the validity of a hierarchy instead of blindly following
it, we must ask the following questions: (1) Does the hierarchy provide
effectiveness and economic benefits to a society; (2) Does it have more pros
than cons; (3) Is a hierarchy a necessary evil to maintain a society; and (4)
How is this hierarchy supported by a legal regime.
If a societal value is located at the top of a hierarchy, people will invest
time and money to protect and reach that value. That is the basis of a
democratic, capitalist society because the highest value is reachable and
attainable. On the other hand, if an entity, such as a political party, is located
at the top of the hierarchy, it will have the power to control the lower
echelons and allocate resources under its own rules. When an entity sets a
value and maintains it through hierarchical ethical and legal mechanisms, the
minority group cannot change the value set by the majority. Thus, the
hierarchical mechanism has the high possibility to be misused as a
conservative tool to keep the status quo of the current value system.
It is a misconception, however, to assume people will always try to
reach the top of the hierarchy, and this causes problems. While a society
creates a hierarchy with the intent to control its citizens, not all members
make an effort to climb the ladder. When the highest value of a society, such
as fundamental freedoms, well-being, peace and security, is not appreciated
and is not motivational, people will ignore their moral duties to each other
and instability will follow. Conservative hierarchies can widen the gap
between the top and bottom, which is often followed by dissatisfaction of the
bottom of the hierarchy and ultimately, instability. If the highest authority or
power is not respected or sought, the resulting anarchistic society needs to
find measures to allocate resources among its constituents. In the 19th
century, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels rejected the existing hierarchical
structure between the bourgeois and proletarians; law, morality, and religion
were seen as biased toward the bourgeois, and as tools based on class

12
13
14

76

Id. at 136.
See id.
See id.

18:73 (2020)

Paradox of Hierarchy and Conflicts of Values

oppression.15 They asserted that the hierarchy be changed by open revolution
and the violent overthrow by the proletariat.16 State governments dominated
by the capitalistic bourgeois and its law disappeared during the revolution,
and as a result, international law based on states also disappeared.17 They
sought an ideological society, where everyone would be equal without
hierarchy,18 but their theories were misused by communists who created
another type of hierarchy: the failed authoritarian state.
A hierarchical structure to preserve and realize values set by the
majority is not perforce justified, especially when it applies to indigenous or
local minority group. This is even true when the values justifying the
hierarchy are not properly communicated to local indigenous societies due
to lack of transportation, infrastructure and communication, among other
reasons. Living in the Arctic Circle, tropical forests, deserts, or islands,
indigenous groups such as the Inuits in Canada, San in Botswana, Dayak in
Indonesia, and Andamanese in the Andaman Islands, are maintaining their
societies outside the hierarchical structure or legal system set by the central
government for thousands of years.19 Their values and mechanism of
allocating resources may have been completely different from the main
society and culture. Thus, it can be problematic to enforce a hierarchy upon
an indigenous group.
In the international context, hierarchies are set up in various ways
among different countries, reflecting diverse social, cultural, and economic
values, which are naturally conflicting and colliding, resulting in an unstable
international society. A hierarchical society can also collide with a society
without a hierarchy. A structurally flat society such as pre-colonial
indigenous groups may not want to follow an imposed hierarchy to which it
did not give informed consent or participate in creating. Furthermore,
different hierarchical structures between the international and national
societies will also cause conflict. International law, with its civil law
characteristics, is not easily incorporated into common law countries. This
conflict intensifies when international law reflects differing national values.
Formation of new international custom may, in effect, boycott countries with
15 KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, Bourgeois and Proletarians, in MANIFESTO OF THE
COMMUNIST
PARTY
14
(1848),
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf.
16 KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, Position of the Communists in Relation to the Various Existing
Opposition Parties in MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, supra note 16, at 34.
17 MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (6th ed., 2008).
18 MARX & ENGELS, supra note 16.
19 See Christopher. R. Duncan, Mixed Outcomes: The Impact of Regional Autonomy and
Decentralization on Indigenous Ethnic Minorities in Indonesia, 38 DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE 711
(2007).
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inconsistent values. For example, international law prohibiting nuclear
weapons’ proliferation among the existing 191 member countries of the NonProliferation Treaty may be ignored by countries who would like to pursue
self-help and seek a new balance of power by owning nuclear weapons such
as India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea.20
In the context of what I have outlined above, my fundamental questions
are as follows:
1. Is hierarchy really necessary in an international society?;
2. Does more hierarchical order in international society mean more
peace?;
3. Do we need a supranational organization like the European Union
whose laws can pierce state sovereignty and bind citizens of each
member state?; and
4. Does the United Nations (U.N.) need more power, which will give
the international society more peace, security, and protect human
rights?
This article may not answer all of these questions, but will attempt to clarify
hierarchical issues in international law, particularly in the human rights field.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HIERARCHY
A. Philosophies, International Theories, and Hierarchy
International law is the law of international society and assumes a legal
hierarchy. It seeks to create international peace and security based on the
assumption that international law governs relations among states and trumps
each state’s national law. Regardless of what kind of philosophy
international law is based on—natural law or legal positivism—,
philosophers of international law are aware of the hierarchical order of
international, regional, and domestic law. The generally-applicable
international law, which was agreed upon among states based on natural
values of human freedom and well-being, is assumed to be higher than
regional or domestic law.
The idea of international law’s primacy has been challenged recently.
The absence of general hierarchy in international law began to gain attention
in addition to the “spontaneous, decentralized and nonhierarchical nature of
international law-making.”21 Disputes are often directed against the legal
value of international law, and most states place authority of international
20

North Korea withdrew from the Non-proliferation treaty in 1993.
Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, ¶¶ 485–86, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13,
2006).
21
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law below their constitution.22 Just as Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s social
contract theory and doctrine of nationalism are based on people’s will to be
bound by the national sovereignty for their sake, each nation and its value
system reflects its homogenous culture and the people’s will.23 Even if
international law is made by state governments, international law that is
contrary to a nation’s value system is difficult to respect and adhere to; this
is especially true when national populism arises as seen recently in Russia,
China, the U.S., the UK, and Brazil. In addition to the domestic scholar’s
bias toward international law as a simple discipline, many third world
countries are acting against the Western-oriented international law,
emphasizing global governance and development through their domestic
society.24 Transnational theory developed by the New Haven School also
emphasizes domestic influence toward the international society and equal
influence and process between domestic law and international law.25
Failure of hierarchical institutions that cannot effectively control states’
unilateral wrongful actions is more serious in the international legal system,
as seen in the U.N.’s failure to control illegal use of force to annex the
territory of another country, unilateral migration control violating human
rights, violations of climate change treaties, and nuclear weapons
development in violation of the Non-Proliferation treaty. It is politically
impossible to reach Reisman’s fourth type of effective hierarchical
institution26 because international treaties are more contractual than
constitutional. International custom and jus cogens have been developed, but
no institution can enforce the order without the consent of the party to be
bound by its jurisdiction. The birth of the U.N., reconstructing the tradition
of the League of Nations, seemed to create an effective hierarchical
institution endowed with exclusive right to use force against threats to peace
and acts of aggression with exceptio for self-defense.27 The hierarchy,
22

U.S. and Republic of Korea are such examples. For the destructuralization of the relationship
between international law and constitutional law based on Kelsenian monism, see Armin von Bogdandy,
Pluralism, Direct Effect, and the Ultimate Say: On the Relationship Between International and Domestic
Constitutional Law, 6 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 397 (2008).
23 See MADS QVORTRUP, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU: THE
IMPOSSIBILITY OF REASON 74–94 (2003). There is also a view that there are global citizens’ preferences
about values and norms that influence states’ willingness to participate in multilateral treaties. See Takashi
Inoguchi & Lien Thi Quynh Le, Toward Modelling a Global Social Contract: Jean-Jacques Rousseau
and John Lock, 17 JAPANESE J. POL. SCI. 489 (2016).
24 See generally B. RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS, AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003).
25 Harold H. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183–84 (1996) [hereinafter
Koh 1]; Harold H. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, in GENERAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 6, 237, 241, 260–63 [hereinafter Koh 2].
26 See Koh 2, supra note 25, at 137–143.
27 See id. at 138 (citing U.N. CHARTER, Chap. VII).
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however, was built on the unstable foundation of five permanent U.N.
Security Council members with unparalleled veto power that no other
member could ever access. When the five permanent members were divided
during the Cold War, the U.N. lost its regulatory enforcement power. Recent
events involving the five permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council—Russia’s annexation of Crimea in the Ukraine, conflicts
surrounding Syria between Russia and the U.S., economic conflicts between
China and the U.S., and South China Sea conflicts between China and the
U.S.—demonstrate the current failure of the U.N. as an effective hierarchy.
Many philosophers have highlighted the hierarchical flaws in the
international society, including the fact that Grotius’s international legal
order based on natural law does not realistically reflect the self-conscious
political relations among states.28 Kantians deny the concept of hierarchy in
an international society because there is no hierarchy in rational authority.29
Hegelians will not adopt the hierarchy in international law because states are
assumed to dialectically compete and fight against each other.30 Under
Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law, international legal hierarchy will fail when it
loses its effectiveness.31 Vattel’s positivism and American legal realism may
support the legal hierarchy and states’ subordination to international law they
agreed to be bound by;32 however, international law is mostly subordinated
to state constitutions under state law superiority. Furthermore, states only
submit themselves to treaties once they are ratified, treating international law
as non-law normative principles,33 or experiencing normative conflict
causing “fragmentation” of international law.34 Rejecting monism or legal
centralism, legal pluralism does not distinguish international law from state
law, and denies its hierarchical superiority.35 The “archipelagic” nature of
international law according to the New Haven School of jurisprudence
naturally does not allow a hierarchy in the international law realm, and power
is simply a factor in the process of international legal order.36

28

See ANTHONY CARTY, PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (2017).
Id. at 55.
30 Id. at 116.
31 Id. at 3. Representing the modern positivist school and advocating monism, Kelsen suggests that
international law is primitive and resembles a pre-state society. SHAW, supra note 17, at 29.
32 GENERAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, at 15.
33 See von Bogdandy, supra note 22; Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. SOC.
SCI. 243, 249 (2009).
34 Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the
diversification and Expansion of International Law, A/CN.4/L.682, ¶ 486 (Apr. 13, 2006).
35 Michaels, supra note 33, at 253.
36 See id.
29
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In his transnational legal process theory,37 Harold H. Koh explains that
states obey international law because of interest, identity, interaction, and
internalization.38 States obey it not because they believe that there is a
hierarchy in the international society, but because their interests will be
harmed and they will be involved in frictions that prevent their ongoing
transnational process.39 Most states’ actions seem to be run by game theory40
and will be predicted to be cooperative based on prisoners’ dilemma and nonzero-sum game thinking.41 In the end, they will internalize international law
into their domestic legal system in order to protect their own interests.42
Because of the normative process in the international society, states do not
follow a set international hierarchy. Under this transnational process theory,
depending on its interest, identity and interaction, a state will either follow
and internalize or deny international law. Recent movements of powerful
states such as the U.S., China, and Russia show the latter example based on
nationalistic populism, completely ignoring cooperative non-zero sum game
theory and threatening globalization and global governance.43 Since 2017,
the U.S. unilaterally imposed tariffs on Chinese imports,44 ignoring the
World Trade Organization (WTO) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
principles.45 Moreover, in 2018, the U.S. renegotiated regional free trade
agreements threatening its withdrawal between 2017 and 2018,46 terminating

37 Koh 1, supra note 25, at 183. The transnational legal process theory was initiated by Phillip Jessup,
Abram Chayes, Tom Ehrlich, Andreas Lowenfeld, Myres McDougal, Harold Lasswell, and Michael
Reisman.
38 Id. at 199.
39 See id.
40 See generally Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, in WORLD POLITICS 25
(1985).
41 Koh 1, supra note 25, at 257.
42 Id. at 261.
43 See Janne E. Nijman & Wouter G. Werner, Populism and International Law: What Backlash and
Which Rubicon?, 49 NETH. Y.B INT’L L. 3, 5–10 (2019).
44 See Chain Brings U.S. Tariff Dispute to WTO, Berates Washington for Blocking Judges, REUTERS
(Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-wto/china-brings-u-s-tariff-disputeto-wto-berates-washington-for-blocking-judges-idUSKCN1PM1YJ;
Pablo
Garrido
Estevez,
Circumventing the WTO: Impermissibility of Tariffs Imposed by the U.S. and China under WTO Law, 40
MICH. J. INT’L. L. ONLINE (Nov. 27, 2018).
45 U.S. allegedly violated the Most Favored Nation treatment under Article I of 1947 GATT and
National Treatment under Article II of 1947 GATT. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; See also WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Principles of the Trading
System, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm.
46 See e.g., Peter Baker, Trump Abandons Trans-Pacific Partnership, Obama’s Signature Trade
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/politics/tpp-trump-tradenafta.html.
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treaties such as the Paris Agreement on Climate Change in 2019,47 and
withdrawing from the U.N. Human Rights Council in 2018.48 China,
violating international principles codified in the U.N. Law of the Sea
convention, extended its regional power in the South China Sea by claiming
historic and sovereign rights relating to artificial islands and features in the
Spratly Islands, Scarborough Shoal, and Paracel Islands. In so doing, China
created conflicts with regional states.49 Lastly, in 2014, Russia illegally
annexed Crimea against Ukrainian sovereignty50 and interfered and
supported wars in the Middle East.51
State-centric nationalism that places its interests above global values
are natural results of the Westphalian system. Just as no country can subject
another country to its own law that reflects its own values, so does
international law traditionally assumes equality of states. Thus, states are not
bound by international law and inter-state governments unless they agree;
this was prevalent among dualists during the nineteenth century, who
emphasized the consent element based on positivism.52 The Westphalian
system, establishing the principle of state sovereignty, did not allow a
hierarchy among its subjects.53
It was not until after World War I that inter-governmental organizations
began to appear, but their authority and function have been limited. These
organizations, supposedly at the pinnacle of the international hierarchy,
cannot pierce state sovereignty and enforce their decisions directly.
Furthermore, international organizations do not effectively control behaviors
of states. Moreover, the permanent members of the U.N Security Council are

47 Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 12, 2015,
T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 (entered into force Nov. 4, 2016); Depository Notification, Paris Agreement, United
States of America: Withdrawal, C.N.575.2019.TREATIES-XXVII.7.d (Nov. 4, 2019) (declaring U.S.
withdrawal from Paris Agreement).
48 Susan H. Allen & Martin S. Edwards, The U.S. Withdrew from the U.N. Human Rights Council.
That’s Not How the Council Was Supposed to Work, WASH. POST (June 26, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/06/26/the-u-s-withdrew-from-the-u-nhuman-rights-council-thats-not-how-the-council-was-supposed-to-work/.
49 See In re Arbitration Between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China,
PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award (July 12, 2016), https://www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/PH-CN%20%2020160712%20-%20Award.pdf.
50 See Anton Bebler, The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict over Crimea, 15 ROMANIAN J. EUR. AFF. 35,
44–46 (2015).
51 See Angela Stent, Putin’s Power Play in Syria: How to Respond to Russia’s Intervention, FOREIGN
AFF. (Jan./Feb. 2016), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2015-12-14/putins-powerplay-syria.
52 SHAW, supra note 17, at 29. (stating that the view of a higher will of the state above any individual
was first analyzed by Hegel).
53 See Mark Weston Janis, Religion and International Law, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. (Nov. 17, 2002),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/7/issue/13/religion-and-international-law.
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never subject to sanctions for violations of international law thanks to their
veto powers. When permanent members of the U.N. Security Council
disregard their leadership role by acting upon national interests,—U.S.
withdrawals from environmental and human rights treaties, Brexit, Russia’s
annexation of Crimea, South China Sea conflicts—intended peace based on
international hierarchy becomes useless. Regardless of the efforts of
international organizations to establish peace, many armed conflicts
followed World War II.54 Thus, rather than being a peacemaking hierarchical
body of law, international law is, in effect, a law of powerful states that
fluctuates in terms of its effectiveness when states rise and fall.55
B. International Institutions and Hierarchy
Hierarchical international institutions have been adopted by states on
an ad hoc basis until the early 20th century.56 In the Western Christian world
before the Westphalian international system, the hierarchy was established
by the Pope and the Holy Roman Empire through religious law and
policies.57 States were subordinate to the Roman Catholic Church and its
political and tax power. This governance, however, was contrary to the
Bible, which taught the paradox of hierarchy and importance of humility.58
According to Jesus’s teachings, the more people that subordinate themselves
at the bottom of the hierarchy by throwing away money, reputation, and
power, the greater the change of entering the narrow door of heaven.59
Catholic religious laws in the medieval era went against the Lord’s teachings,

54

Examples include Israel’s ethnic cleansing, the Kashmir dispute, violence in Cambodia, civil war
in Somali, the Rwandan civil war, the Srebrenica Massacre, the Darfur conflict in Sudan, the invasion of
Iraq, the Syrian civil war, violence in South Sudan, civil war in Yemen , and the Rohingya crisis. See
Twelve Times the UN Has Failed the World, TRTWORLD (Nov. 28, 2018),
https://www.trtworld.com/americas/twelve-times-the-un-has-failed-the-world-21666 [hereinafter Twelve
Times the UN Has Failed the World].
55 See Michael Byers, Symposium: The Steadfastness of International Law, OPINIOJURIS (Nov. 19,
2018), http://opiniojuris.org/2018/11/19/34288/ (“[T]he international legal system has always responded
to major shifts in the identity, character, and priorities of powerful states. The German diplomat-scholar
Wilhelm Grewe divided the history of international law into periods of hegemonic dominance, from
Holland in the 17th century to the United States after the Cold War. Grewe’s analysis was Eurocentric,
statist, and materialist in its understanding of power, but seen from the vantage point of 2018, his thesis—
that the international legal system evolves with the rise and fall of powerful states—is almost
indisputable.”).
56 Reisman, supra note 11, at 127.
57 SHAW, supra note 17.
58 Proverbs 22:2; Psalm 67:4; Leviticus 19:33–34; Colossians 3:10–11.
59 James 2:1–4; Galatians 3:26–29; Mark 12:33; Matthew 19:24.
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and instead set a hierarchical order upon which the Church governed the
western world.60
Contrary to its efforts to keep this hierarchical order, the Holy Roman
Empire started crumbling after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, when
sovereign states began to mutually recognize each other either through
treaties or custom.61 After the establishment of the Westphalian system,
states began to build an international legal hierarchy, by which they
voluntarily promised to be bound. They willingly submitted themselves to
this hierarchy to gain stability and peace, admitting that the hierarchy does
not perforce guarantee the stability and security due to its lack of
enforceability.62 International law relating to war, commerce, and territorial
boundaries was formed.63 The League of Nations after World War I created
by the 1919 Peace Treaty could be considered the culmination of
international hierarchical development since the Peace of Westphalia
because it hierarchically managed the world order, a new political
development since the fall of the Holy Roman Empire. That being said, it did
not effectively prevent the occurrence of World War II.
A stronger intergovernmental entity, the U.N., to which states gave
more power than the League of Nations, was created after World War II. Just
like the Westphalian system, however, the U.N. did not effectively pierce
state sovereignty to bind states, with the exception of the U.N. Security
Council decisions in the matters of international peace and security.64 Most
economic, social and cultural matters have still remained in the domestic
realm. While the U.N. was given privileges, and U.N. officials enjoy
immunities within states, this does not mean the U.N. is higher hierarchically
than the state. Rather, the U.N. is mutually respected by a state who grants
privileges and immunities. The only decisions that bind a state are those
made by the UN Security Council,65 but those can only be limitedly issued
in relation to international peace and security. While under Article 25 of the
U.N. Charter,66 members accept and carry out the decision of the U.N.

60 ”[T]he hierarchical nature of Catholicism sets it apart from other Christian churches. It is a pyramid
with the Pope at the top, followed by cardinals (who have the right to elect a new pope on the death of
the current incumbent), archbishops, bishops, priests, deacons and laity.” Peter Stanford, Roman Catholic
Church,
BBC
(June
29,
2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/christianity/catholic/catholic_1.shtml.
61 See CARTY, supra note 28, at 7.
62 See id.
63 SHAW, supra note 17, at 19–30.
64 Enforceability of security council decisions is another matter.
65 U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
66 Id.
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Security Council, its bindingness is contentious.67 Even if it is binding, its
effectiveness is questionable. Furthermore, it is not binding on the non-U.N.
member countries. It is difficult to justify fifteen U.N. security council
members making a decision that binds all 193 countries. There is no reason
that countries who are not members of the U.N. Security Council would
willingly follow its decision when they think it does not represent their ideas.
To make matters worse, decisions are sometimes vetoed by the permanent
five members if the decision conflicts with their own interests. Thus, this
politically biased decision-making entity cannot effectively bind and further
enforce its decision on the other member countries.
Regional developments may be the only exception to hierarchical
failures. Regionally, the European Coal and Steel Community, Euratom, and
European Economic Community (“EEC”) created a new hierarchical order
in Europe in the 1950s. The so-called supranational organizations were born
in Europe, expecting to be further developed in the international arena. The
EEC was developed into the current European Union (“EU”) in 1993 in
Maastricht, the Netherlands, and started expanding its area of cooperation
into climate, environment, health, external relations, security, justice, and
immigration.68 The EU can make its own laws, so-called secondary
legislation, through its institutions—the European Parliament, the European
Council and the European Commission. One of its secondary legislation
tools, EU regulation, pierces state sovereignty and is directly enforceable to
the citizens of 28 member countries.69 This supranational hierarchy was in
part possible due to the shared values among member states. These values
include attaining peace and security and encouraging economic prosperity.
While the EU is a success story in many ways, it also has its hierarchical
failures, exemplified by its inability to effectively deal with recent migration
turmoil, and also Brexit.70 As of 2019, the dream of adding more EU
members to eventually cover the world seems impossible as seen by
Turkey’s stalled access to the EU since 2016.71 Revising the U.N. Charter or
adopting a new treaty to create a supra-national organization seems

67 See Rosalyn Higgins, The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions are binding under
Article 25 of the Charter?, 21 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 270 (1972); Derek Bowett, The Impact of Security
council Decisions on Dispute Settlement Procedures, 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 89 (1994).
68 See PHILIP RAWORTH, EUROPEAN UNION LAW GUIDE § 1:3–§ 1:8 (2019).
69 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 288, June 7,
2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 47.
70 See Agust Arnorsson & Gylfi Zoega, On the Causes of Brexit, 55 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 301 (2018).
71 Turkey’s access to EU was stalled mainly because of EU countries’ blame on human rights
violations and lack of rule of law. See Ece Toksabay & Tuvan Gumrukcu, Erdogan Warns Europeans
‘Will Not Walk Safely’ if Attitude Persists, as Row Carries On, REUTERS, (Mar. 22, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-referendum-europe-idUSKBN16T13E.
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impossible in the current world pluralistically fragmented by geography,
levels of development, economy, politics, security, territory, culture,
intellectual property, human rights, etc. Indeed, consensus seems
unattainable in a world where actors include various intergovernmental
organizations, non-governmental organizations, the BRICS, the G20, the
Global South, the EU, the Council of Europe, the Organization of American
States, NATO, the Arab League, the ASEAN, the African Union, etc. In this
multi-dimensionally divided world, internationally-shared values are hard to
find and define. Thus, it is not possible or efficient to build a hierarchy based
on global values; it is rather more effective to rely on global governance
based on dynamic transnational process.
III. DEVELOPMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HIERARCHY
In this part, I would like to analyze and discuss various aspects of
hierarchy existing in human rights law. As applied to human rights law, both
structural hierarchy to enforce human rights values and value-focused
normative hierarchy do not work effectively.
A. Human Rights Principles and Hierarchy
Human rights are built on the equality of all human beings. Dividing
humans into different ranks based on race, sex, religion, nationality, and
membership in a collective group is discriminatory and violates these rights.
After the establishment of the U.N., the universality of human rights
successfully pierced into sovereign states, establishing a hierarchical order.
Reflected in the U.N. Charter,72 and various human rights instruments
including the international bill of rights consisting of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights,73 the U.N. established human rights as internationallyshared values, uniting the world in a hierarchically globalized society.
The U.N. General Assembly and its subsidiary organs, the
implementing hierarchical system for human rights, is challenged due to the
fundamental normative limits of the General Assembly; resolutions and
decisions of the General Assembly lack binding and enforceable authority.
Treaty-based bodies created by many human rights treaties diversify this
effort and reduce the efficiency of the U.N.-based hierarchy. Furthermore,
72 Stating the importance of the “the dignity and worth of the human person.” U.N. CHARTER,
Preamble.
73 See generally G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 1057; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
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the political division between North and South shakes the basis of the
hierarchy, rendering it ineffective. The degree to which human rights
definitions and scopes of protection against violations vary among states also
decreases hierarchical efficiency.
The hierarchical failure to implement and enforce human rights
principles was followed by prevalent ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity on massive scales in various regions, including in Asia, Africa, and
Eastern Europe.74 This led the U.N. Security Council and member-states to
apply humanitarian law to human rights law75 and to consider the
responsibility of the international community to protect via intervention,
ultimately leading to the development of the Responsibility to Protect
doctrine in 2005.76 Nevertheless, exemplified by events in Darfur, this effort
failed due to a lack of support from the international community and the fear
of unilateral military intervention.77
Hierarchical protection of human rights does not work effectively by
merely creating value-focused normative hierarchy. The paramountcy of
human rights does not mean that there should be a value hierarchy of rights
among human rights. Distinguishing between universally applied human
rights among states and human rights respected only within a country is
meaningless. While the implementation of a certain right may be realized at
the expense of another, it simply means there is a priority among human
rights.78 For example, consider an indigenous group that seeks the human
rights of dignity, life, food, water, land, and cultural and religious identities.
Promoting the human rights of a certain indigenous group may be realized

74 See Twelve Times the UN Has Failed the World, supra note 54 (providing examples such as
Israel’s ethnic cleansing, the dispute in Kashmir, violence in Cambodia, Somali’s civil war, Rwanda’s
civil war, the Srebrenica massacre, the Sudanese conflict in Darfur, the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Syria’s civil
war, South Sudan’s civil war, Yemen’s civil war, and the Rohingya crisis).
75 See CHANDRA LEKHA SRIRAM ET AL., WAR, CONFLICT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 54 (3d ed., 2018).
76 See generally DORIS KÖNIG ET AL., INT’L LAW TODAY: NEW CHALLENGES AND THE NEED FOR
REFORM? (Doris König et al. eds., 2d ed., 2008); INSTITUTE FOR ETHICS, GOVERNANCE & LAW,
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND SOVEREIGNTY (Charles Sampford & Ramesh Thakur eds., 2013);
JULIA HOFFMANN ET AL., RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: FROM PRINCIPLE TO PRACTICE (Julia Hoffman
& Andre Nollkaemper eds., 2012); SRIRAM, supra note 75, at 54–70; PETER HILPOLD ET AL., THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P): A NEW PARADIGM OF INTERNATIONAL LAW? (Peter Hilpold ed.,
2015); SERENA K. SHARMA ET AL., THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT (Serena K. Sharma & Jennifer M.
Welsh eds., 2015).
77 See Alex De Waal, Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect, 83 INT’L AFF. 1039
(2007); Nick Grono, Briefing—Darfur: The International Community’s Failure to Protect, 105 AFR. AFF.
621 (2006); Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention, 84
INT’L AFF. 615 (2008).
78 Kate Halvorsen, Notes on the Realization of the Human Right to Education, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 341,
347 (1990).
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by loosening environmental regulations and creating exceptions to other
areas of law. This is not because there is a hierarchy of rights between human
rights and environmental rights, but because certain human rights should be
prioritized depending on the circumstances.
Arguably, enforcement of human rights may be more effective if there
were a clear hierarchy among human rights because domestic law
enforcement would have clearer application standards.79 If a state’s
government, either the legislative or judicial branch, believes that civil and
political rights are more important than economic, social, and cultural rights,
or clearly distinguish between core rights and rights that they can
progressively achieve, the state could adopt the more important rights first
as their domestic law.80 In this case, more positive social and economic rights
could be progressively achieved. It is true that realizing rights one by one
and little by little can be less burdensome than trying to reach all rights
simultaneously. This approach, however, is dangerous because defining and
distinguishing core rights is a daunting task that is wrought with subjectivity.
While equally treating human rights is impossible due to the conflicting
natures of rights and duties among rights holders, human rights must be
realized in a timely order based on the paramountcy of human rights and
practical reality rather than subjective hierarchical ranks.
B. Human Rights Cities and Hierarchy.
Following natural law, most countries cannot place their political and
governmental interests over fundamental human values by simply setting up
a hierarchy among groups. Theoretically, governments could be structurally
organized to enforce human rights norms in hierarchical orders, such as
international and regional, national and federal, state and local government.
Laws can also be hierarchically organized into international law, regional
law, state constitutions, federal law, state law, and local law. However, that
is not necessarily how it happens in reality. Depending on each state,
international law can be ranked in terms of preemptive power above, below
or on par with a state’s constitution. Human rights principles are usually
adopted as a hard law of treaty or international custom. Because of the
unclear status of international law, however, human rights principles are not
necessarily self-executing. Most international lawyers are skeptical on the

79

International enforcement may be problematic because there is no such body except very limited
application of the United Nations peacekeeping force.
80 More leftist stakeholders would try to adopt and implement more economic, social and cultural
rights and rights that can be achieved progressively, burdening government budgets.
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status of international law in a domestic legal system,81 domestic law
professionals lower its status as a scholarly discipline, and many see it as a
meaningless gesture that states use for cooperation and negotiation
strategies.82
Due to the dubious nature of the hierarchy of international law and
among subjects of international law, unilateral local movements have
recently formed to adopt human rights principles as local ordinances or
municipal codes, contrary to state governments that have failed to adopt the
principles nationally. Those cities that have adopted the principles locally
are called human rights cities.83 Boston, U.S., and Gwangju, South Korea are
such cities. While these movements have been threatened to be preempted
by state governments,84 they are good examples of flipping state and
international hierarchies on their heads, making them useless and
paradoxical.
C. Indigenous World, Education, and Hierarchy
The indigenous world is a good example of paradoxically contradicting
hierarchical theories of international law. The indigenous world is selfsufficient and sustainable without being interrupted by domestic and
international legal systems. The modern concept of a state based on
Rousseau’s social contract85 theory fails to consider certain minority races
and the indigenous world. Family-based tribes have elders and leaders who
provide wisdom and social leadership. While they were secluded from the
international world on the Asian, American, and African continents, they
have successfully survived thousands of years, harmonizing with nature and
living sustainably: hunting and fishing, farming, gathering, and raising
domestic animals. Having lived peacefully and sustainably for such a long
time, does the indigenous world needed to be governed by a positivist foreign
state, or an international legal order? No, the indigenous world does not need
to give up their power, territory, population and political autonomy for the
better good as defined by the Western world. Subjecting them to the existing
hierarchy that does not reflect their culture, society and political structure,
81 See Karen Knop, Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 501, 503 (2000).
82 Many states agree to bind themselves to treaties, but do not implement or even violate them.
83 See GLOBAL URBAN JUSTICE: THE RISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS CITIES (Barbara Oomen et al. eds.,
2016). There are also fake human rights cities that call themselves as such, but in reality, they do not
adopt law relating to human rights principles.
84 See Martha F. Davis, Design Challenges for Human Rights Cities, 49 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
27, 29 (2017).
85 See MADS QVORTRUP, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU: THE
IMPOSSIBILITY OF REASON 74–94 (2003).
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harms their self-sufficient sustainable world. Western religion, technology,
processed food, manufactured clothing, and artificial materials do not
necessarily help indigenous cultures but rather make them dependent upon
the foreign state. While Socratic positivist law of a Western state seemingly
guarantees peace and security in a society, the indigenous world has existed
independently, keeping its own natural law that can provide peace to the
world. The law of a Western state does not reflect the fundamental values
indigenous people have kept for thousands of years. Furthermore, the
meanings of moral values, needs, and peace are different from tribe to tribe.86
If hierarchy does not work well in the indigenous world, teaching
indigenous people they should follow a the new hierarchy a state orders them
to follow is useless. Will education help protect existing indigenous people
from any legal system based on modern international hierarchy? A NeoWeberian would say that any education for this indigenous group will
permanently change their status from peripheral to integrated in the main
society.87 A Neo-Marxist will say this will increase inequality between the
main society and the indigenous society.88 The main society’s values and
cultures will be infused into the indigenous society, and will force younger
generations to throw away traditional religious beliefs and cultural values.
New capitalistic ideas will make them compete with each other for money,
breaking traditional harmony within the indigenous society. Without
hierarchy, traditional indigenous history and values can be transnationally
diffused into the main society and reflected in policy and law.
D. Local public policy, values, and theories
Whether following positivism or naturalistic monism, international law
cannot completely pierce state sovereignty to nullify local custom, and
normative policies reflecting local moral values. This also applies to private
international law where relations between private entities are the center of
normative development. New lex mercatoria, seeking the harmonization of
private international law through international conventions, respects local
normative policies and moral values while treating as obstacles any national
law that increases transactional costs.89 New lex mercatoria, seeking
86

For example, the differences between the Hutu and Tutsi led to the killing of about 800,000 people.
Rwanda, COUNTRIES AND THEIR CULTURES, https://www.everyculture.com/No-Sa/Rwanda.html (last
viewed Dec. 30, 2019); Rwanda Genocide: 100 Days of Slaughter, BBC (Apr. 4, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506.
87 See e.g., POWER AND IDEOLOGY IN EDUCATION (J. Jarabel and A.H. Halsey eds., 1979);
Halvorsen, supra note 78, at 341–364.
88 Halvorsen, supra note 78, at 341–364.
89 Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance, 13 J. EUR. PUB.
POL’Y 627, 627 (2006).
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transnational governance, focuses on the importance of local moral values
and normative policies, denying the common absolute values upon which the
hierarchical structure of public international law is based.
As such, identifying the common absolute values upon which the
hierarchical structure or global governance of international law is based is
idealistic. Western theories such as American realism cannot directly apply
to Asian societies. Even inside the Asian area, the legal reasoning that led to
the arbitral decision of the South China Sea disputes in the Permanent Court
of Arbitration cannot resolve the matters relating to the Dokdo Island issue
between Korea and Japan because both countries attribute different historical
values to the island as well as different emotional attachment.90 It is believed
that China will observe international law to the extent that it conforms to its
policies and interests.91 A few other examples of the difficulty in discerning
common world values are public policy exceptions to the recognition and
enforcement of international arbitral decisions under the New York
Convention;92 local policy considerations in regional free trade agreements
and bilateral investment treaties;93 Asian, African and Latin theories and
practice of international law;94 claims to historic and sovereign rights to
specific features in the South China Sea;95 and fraud exceptions to the
independence principle of the Uniform Customs and Practice 600.96
IV. CONCLUSION
International hierarchy that does not common historical and societal
values cannot be enforced in countries that have different social and
historical cultures and norms reflecting diverse values. Not only has
international hierarchy failed to effectively implement and enforce
international norms as seen in the human rights field, but it is also difficult
to clearly define and establish. The Westphalian state-based system acts as
90 See DOKDO: HISTORICAL APPRAISAL AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 2 (Seokwoo Lee & Hee Eun
Lee eds., 2011).
91 SHAW, supra note 17, at 38.
92 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art V(2)(b), June 10,
1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958).
93 Enforcement can be rejected by a country if it believes that enforcement is contrary to public
policy. See Scott Barrett, Introduction to the Special Issue-Trade and Environment: Local Versus
Multilateral Reforms, 5 ENV’T AND DEV. ECON. 349, 351, 354, 356 (2000).
94 See e.g., NORTHEAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
AND CHALLENGES (Seokwoo Lee & Hee Eun Lee eds., 2013).
95 This is an example of claiming an exception to the general law of sea principles. See In the Matter
of the South China Sea Arbitration, PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award (July 6, 2015),
https://www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/PH-CN%20-%2020160712%20-%20Award.pdf.
96 Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits: UCP 600, Arts 4 and 5. UCP 600 is silent
on the issue of fraud, leaving its regulation to local law such as UCC § 5-109.
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an obstacle to reaching a globalized society, especially when states are driven
by populism as recently seen in the U.S., China, Russia, U.K., Brazil, etc.
The international society is losing its leaders, the great powers, that would
be willing to give up national interests and resources to support and maintain
a globalized society.
It is a long shot to resolve the many international issues, such as
migration and climate change, through a hierarchical system such as the U.N.
But this article does not attempt to claim that anarchistic unorganized and
non-hierarchical constitutive structures are superior to organized and
hierarchical constitutive structure. The absence of hierarchy may mean chaos
where “[t]he strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must.”97
However, even in unorganized and non-hierarchical constitutive structure,
the world, through global governance, may be able to keep peace and restrain
any unilateral delictual action through transnational process. As Reisman
suggests, many other non-state actors in addition to states appear, and they
are participating in the constitutive process, acting as restraints;98 the nongovernmental actors such as NGOs and the media play more active roles in
the human rights area.99 State elites, in protecting their interests, are more
restrained in human rights.100 Thus, effective but non-hierarchical structures
working within a transnational world, if unhindered by nationalism and
populism, are achievable and desirable.
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Reisman, supra note 11, at 133 (citing HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL,
JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY (1992)).
98 Reisman, supra note 11, at 141–43.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 141.
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